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Abstract. This paper describes a methodology for modeling and verifying protocols for asyn- 
chronous message passing systems. It combines the techniques of finite state analysis and axiomatic 
verification. It overcomes the problem of state explosion by using variables and logical assertions 
where the finite state approach would require a large number of states. By explicitly including 
states where interactions between processes occur, the complexity of assertional proofs is sig- 
nificantly reduced. Properties like freedom from deadlock, freedom from unspecified message 
receptions, boundedness of channel size, and partial correctness can be proved. Properties of 
channels like losing or garbling messages can be modeled, as can premature and non-premature 
timeouts. The technique is illustrated by proving a sliding window flow control protocol and an 
alternating bit protocol that is correct only if timeouts are non-premature. 
1. Introduction 
Two basic directions have been followed in proving properties of asynchronous 
message passing protocols: the finite state machine approach and the axiomatic 
approach. In the finite state machine approach, each participating process is modeled 
by a finite state machine, and the communication links are modeled by channels. 
to prove a property of a protocol, one constructs a global state machine, whose 
states are members of the Cartesian product of-the states of the individual state 
machines and of the channels. The problem of verifying a protocol reduces to 
determining whether certain global states are reachable from the initial configuration. 
Properties that can be verified in this way include freedom from deadlock, freedom 
from unspecified message receptions, and boundedness of channels [3, 5, 6, 10, 20]. 
A limitation of this method is that a separate state is required for each possible 
value of a variable and for each possible channel configuration. This makes the size 
of the global state transition graph exponential in the range of variable values. If 
the channels are unbounded, this problem is undecidable. In [17] it is shown that 
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even when the channel size is bounded, the problem of determining whether a 
deadlock state is reachable is PSPACE hard if the channels are FIFO, and NP hard 
if not. 
The axiomatic approach stems from the work of Floyd [9], who used predicate 
calculus assertions to describe the semantics of programs. The same approach is 
used in [11] and [8]. Ashcroft and Manna [2] extended this idea to parallel processes 
by showing how to transform such a system to an equivalent non-deterministic 
program. The resulting programs and their proofs could be large and complex, and 
Ashcroft and Manna presented a method of simplifying them based on the indepen- 
dence of parallel branches. Owicki and Gries [15] developed a proof technique in 
which a property is proved for each process in isolation, then interference freedom 
is shown. The complexity of proofs in both methods is similar: as Lamport observed 
in [1], "the same amount of verification is required in both methods". Schlichting 
and Schneider [ 18] extended the method in [15] to asynchronous message passing 
systems, modeling communication li ks by shared auxiliary variables, and introduc- 
ing proof rules for sending and receiving messages. The methods above were designed 
for proving general parallel programs. In such programs, the execution of any 
statement in one process could interfere with the proof of another. As a result, they 
require a large number of interference freedom proofs. 
In this paper, we take advantage of the fact that in message passing systems with 
no shared memory, the points where interference could occur are limited to the 
receipt of messages. We use concepts from the finite state approach to explicitly 
identify states where interference could occur. This simplifies proving properties of 
asynchronous message passing protocols by reducing the burden of proving interfer- 
ence freedom. At the same time, the method overcomes the state explosion of the 
finite state approach by modeling variables explicitly and using assertions to describe 
their properties. The model is flexible enough to allow a protocol to be specified 
and verified by either the axiomatic or the finite state method, but its advantage is
that it permits a combination of both. 
We also present a comprehensive model for timeouts, which is powerfulenough 
to express non-premature timeouts. We demonstrate he use of this model in the 
proof of an alternating bit protocol that is correct only if timeouts are non-premature. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model, and 
in Section 3 we present he proof system. Section 4 completes the model to allow 
for message loss and timeouts. A discussion of our results concludes the paper. 
2. The basic model 
The systems we model consist of a set of processes exchanging messages across 
an asynchronous communication network. Processes perform local computations 
and have no shared memory. Different properties of communications etworks-- 
FIFO message delivery, unreliability, bounded network capacity, etc.--can be 
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modeled. The model can be applied to high-level application programs as well as 
to low-level data link protocols. 
2.1. Processes 
A process is modeled by a set of local variables and a state transition graphDa 
directed graph, with a finite set S of nodes, called states, and a set T of labeled 
edges, called transitions, between odes in S. A process tarts executing in its initial 
state and performs transitions non-deterministically. If a process enters a state out 
of which there are no transitions (final state), it terminates. 
There are two types of transitions: send and receive transitions (Fig. 1). The send 
transition in Fig. l(a) is enabled if the process is in state S~ and the boolean guard 
( 
@ 
send 
I 
LC2 
guard ~ ~ guard 
local computation l,, LCl 
I )sendstatement(receive) 
I 
local computation LC2 1 
local computation 
receive statement 
local computation 
(a) Send Transition (b) Receive Transition 
Fig. 1. 
B is true. The receive transition in Fig. l(b) is enabled if the process is in state $1, 
the guard B is true, and the receive statement is executable (see Section 2.2). A 
process can only execute nabled transitions. A transition from $1 to $2 is executed 
by carrying out the local computation LC1, executing the send or receive statement 
as described below, and performing the local computation LC2. Guards and local 
computations involve only local variables of the process. If the guard is the value 
true or if a local computation is absent, it is not included in our figures. 
A given process can be represented in our system in more than one way. It is 
possible to model it using a single state and guarded transitions from this state back 
to itself. This is equivalent to the axiomatic approach. On the other hand, local 
variables can be eliminated by introducing a state for each value a variable takes. 
This results in a finite state machine. The strength of this technique is that a protocol 
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designer can combine the two approaches, choosing states and variables in a way 
that reflects his or her intuitive understanding of the system behavior. For example, 
a state would be chosen to represent he fact that all buffers are full, or that 
a process is blocked waiting for a response. Properties of states can then be 
conveniently described by assertions as shown later. 
2.2. Channels 
A channel is a named unidirectional link between two processes, across which a 
source sends messages to a destination. A message is a tuple of data items contained 
in named data fields. Messages have types; the type of a message m is denoted 
m. type. A channel c is represented by two channel sequences and a successor function. 
Sentc is the sequence of messages placed on c by the source, and Receivedc is the 
sequence of messages received on c by the destination. The successor function, 
next,, depends on the values of the channel sequences and on properties of the 
communication medium modeled. Its value is the smallest set S of messages such 
that the next message that can be received on channel c belongs to $. For example, 
for a non-FIFO, loss-free channel that does not generate spurious messages, next~ 
is the set {Sent~- Received~}, since any message sent but not yet received could be 
the next one received. If the channel is FIFO, next~ is {Sent~.[length(Receivedc)+ 1]}, 
where X.i  is the ith message in sequence X. For a FIFO channel on which messages 
could be garbled but not lost, nextc is {Sent~.[length(Receivedc)+ 1]}u {(garbage)}, 
where (garbage) is a garbled message. A channel is said to be empty if the value of 
next, is the empty set. We let empty(c) stand for the assertionn "channel c is empty". 
A send statement has the form 
send(c, type:t, fl:ea,f2:e2, . . . ,fk:ek) 
and the following semantics: in channel c, place a message of type t, with data fields 
named f l , f2 , . . .  ,fk. The values placed in these fields are the values of el, e2, . . . ,  ek, 
which are expressions involving local variables of the process executing the send. 
Executing a send statement extends the sequence Sent~ by the message sent. 
A receive statement has the form 
receive(c, type: t, f l : vl, f 2 : v2, . . . , f k : Vk ). 
Here v~, v2 , . . . ,  Vk are local variables. This statement has the following meaning. 
If channel c is not empty, and the message at the head of c (an element of next~) 
is of type t, remove the message from c and set the values of variables v~, v2 , . . . ,  Vk 
to the values in the fields f~,fz,- • • , fk of the message. This statement is executable 
only if the channel c is not empty, and the message at the head of c is of type t. 
Executing a receive statement extends Received~ by the message received. 
2.3. Example 
Figures 2 and 3 show a sliding window flow control protocol, as modeled in our 
system. It is similar to a selective repeat protocol described in [21]. There are two 
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AS 
TS1 / ~ " ~  "~. . .~  TS3 
~ l a s t ]  = T; 
s_high = s_high • I; s_Iow = s_Iow ~ I; 
high = high + I; low = low + I; 
end; 
) 
\ 
send (SR, type:MSG, seq:s_high, 
data:info[high]) / 
TS4 
sdend (SR, type:MSG, seq:s_last, 
ata: info[ Iow + (s_last e s_low)]) / 
I 
/ 
Notation 
e(e) :  
[a . . .  b]: 
(a . . .  b): 
(a . . .b] :  
Sender variables 
info[1..]: 
s_high: 
s_low: 
s_last: 
info[high]: 
info[low]: 
acknowledged[i]: 
SW_SIZE: 
modulo M addition (subtraction) 
the interval a, ae  1, ae2 , . . . ,  b 
the interval ae  1 , . . . ,  be  1 
the interval ae  1 , . . . ,  be  1, b 
array of data items to be transmitted to receiver. 
(Modulo M variable) sequence number of the last message sent, ignoring retrans- 
missions (initialized to 0). 
(Modulo M variable) sequence number of the message before the first unacknowl- 
edged message (initialized to 0). ((s_low... s_high] is the sending window) 
(Modulo M variable) sequence number of last message for which a positive or a 
negative acknowledgement has been received. 
data item sent in message with sequence number s_high (high is initialized to 0). 
data item in the message with sequence number s_low (low is initialized to 0). 
(Boolean) T only if i ~ (s_low... s_high] and the sender has received an acknowl- 
edgement for the last message sent with sequence number L (Since (s_low...  s_high] 
is empty on initialization, acknowledged[i] is initialized to F for all i.) 
maximum sending window size (SW_SIZE ~ < M-1) .  
Fig. 2. Sender protocol and variables. 
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~se "x~ (ffreceive (SR' type: MSG' seq:s--n°' ~ l nd (RS, type: NAK, seq:s_no) / L  data:d_item) send (RS, type:ACK, seq:s_no) 
C 
TR1 
accepted[filled + (s_noOr_low)] 
= d_item; 
while(accepted[filled] ~ J_) 
filled = filled + 1; 
r_Jow = r_Iow (~ I; 
end; 
Receiver variables 
accepted[1...]: 
filled: 
r_low: 
s_no :  
d_item: 
array into which data items accepted by the receiver are placed (each element is 
initialized to undefined). 
all items in accepted[I-filled] have been received and acknowledged. No array 
element in this range is undefined. (initialized to O) 
sequence number of message that carried the data item in accepted[filled]. (r_low, 
initialized to O, is the lower bound of the receiver's window) 
sequence number of last message received. 
data item in last message received. 
Fig. 3. Receiver protocol and variables. 
processes, the sender (see Fig. 2) and the receiver (see Fig. 3), connected by two 
perfect FIFO channels--SR from the sender to the receiver, and RS from the 
receiver to the sender. The sender takes data from the array info and sends them 
in numbered messages to the receiver on channel SR. Sequence numbers are in the 
range 0 to M-  1. The maximum window size for the sender is SW_SIZE, that is, 
it does not transmit more than SW_SIZE - 1 new messages after the first unacknowl- 
edged one. The receiver window size is RW_SIZE. It accepts a message if its 
sequence number is in the receive window, and rejects it otherwise. If it accepts a 
message, it places the data into the array accepted and sends an acknowledgement 
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on channel RS, containing the sequence number of the message accepted. Otherwise, 
it sends a negative acknowledgement containing the sequence number of the message 
rejected. On receiving a negative acknowledgement, the sender retransmits the 
rejected message. To be able to reuse sequence numbers without ambiguity, 
SW_SIZE is less than or equal to M-  1. 
3. Proof system 
To prove a property of a distributed system modeled as above, a global state 
transition graph is first constructed. Its states are members of the Cartesian product 
of the states of the individual processes. S = (Sk, Si, . . . ,  S,,,) denotes a global state, 
where process 1 is in its kth state, process 2 is in its lth state, and so on. Sd denotes 
the jth component of global state St. Thus in the example above, S.1 is Sk. Each 
global state transition corresponds to a state transition in one, and only one, of the 
component processes) The global state transition graph contains a transition T 
from state Si to state Sj if, and only if, there is an n such that there is a transition 
T from state Si.n to Sj.n in the state transition graph of process n, and for all k # n, 
S~.k = Sj.k. Note that the size of the global transition graph is independent of the 
channel size, and proportional to the product of the sizes of the graphs of the 
component processes. Figure 4 shows the state transition graphs for the processes 
in Figs. 2 and 3 and the system state transition graph. 
The next step is to associate a predicate with each global state. Predicates are 
assertions on the values of the local variables of the processes and the values of the 
channel sequences. The predicate associated with state S~ will be denoted by P~. It 
C 
TR2 'R TI 
TS1 ~ $ 2  
TS3 TS4 
~ $2 
TRl / 
TS3 TS4 TS3 'FS4 
TRI 
Fig. 4. State transition graph for sliding window protocol. 
This does not allow synchronous message passing to be modeled. By allowing a global state transition 
to correspond to a local transition in both a source and a destination process, and making appropriate 
changes in the proof rules, the model can be extended to cover synchronous message passing. 
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must then be shown that the predicate associated with the initial global state is 
satisfied by the initial values of the variables, with the channel sequences empty. 
Also, for every transition Si-T--> Sj, {P~} T {Pj} must be a theorem in our proof 
system, where Pi is the predicate associated with S~. 
Our proof system consists of the axioms and inference rules of a programming 
logic system such as in [18]. The axioms for the send and receive statements follow. 
Sending a message m on a channel c does not change the value of any variable 
of the source; it only affects the state of c, extending Sentc by m. Let px, ..... xk represent Yl,-.-,Yk 
the assertion P with y~, . . . ,  Yk textually substituted for x~, . . . ,  Xk, and let X. R be 
the sequence formed by concatenating record R onto the sequence of records X. 
The send axiom is as follows: 
{ pSent  c 
Semc'{type: t ,  f l :e l  ..... fk:ek}~ 
send(c, type:t, f l :eb  . . . ,A:ek) 
{P} 
The receive statement, on the other hand, could alter values of destination's 
variables. It also changes the state of the channel. The receive axiom is 
pRece ived  c, v I ..... v k ), 
{Vm ~ nextc with m.type = t : - -Received.m, nty  l ..... m.Ykj  
receive( c, type: t, f l : Vl,...,fk :Vk ) 
{P} 
The inference rule for the send (receive) transition is the following. Let T be the 
transition S~- B- Cl-send(receive)- C2+ Sj. 
Send (Receive) rule 
{P^B} C, {R} 
{R} send (receive) {S} 
{S} C2 {Q} 
{P} T {Q} 
In Appendix A we show the assertions associated with each of the global states 
of Fig. 4 and give a detailed proof of the theorem {Po,o} TS1 {Po,o} corresponding 
to the transition TS1 from state So,o back to So,o. The proofs for the other transitions 
are similar. 
Finally, we must show that the properties desired of the system follow from the 
predicates associated with the global states. Among the properties that can be proved 
in our system are freedom from unspecified message receptions, freedom from 
deadlock, and various safety properties. 
3.1. Freedom f rom unspecified message receptions 
Unspecified message receptions can occur in protocols for which incoming 
messages are not buffered automatically, such as data link protocols. In this case, 
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whenever a channel is not empty, a destination must be in a state from which it is 
possible to execute a receive transition for the type of message at the head of the 
channel. Otherwise, the message would be lost and the message reception is said 
to be unspecified. To prove that a protocol is free from unspecified receptions, one 
shows that for every state Sk, the predicate Pk implies that if nextc contains a message 
of type t, then there is at least one enabled receive transition of type t on channel 
c out of Sk. This may be expressed formally as follows: 
Let the set Arc contain the types of the messages in next,. For each type t in N~, 
let Bi (0 < i ~<j) be the guards on the receive transitions of type t on channel c. 
Then the protocol is free from unspecified receptions if, for all states Sk with 
assertion Pk, 
Pk ~ V channels c: {V types t~ N~:[3i:Bi]}. (3.1) 
3.2. Freedom from deadlock 
A protocol normally terminates by entering a final state. It also terminates if the 
system enters a non-final state out of which there is no enabled transition. This form 
of termination is called deadlock and is usually undesirable. To prove that a protocol 
is free from deadlock, we need to show that for every non-final state Sk, the predicate 
Pk implies that either there is an enabled send transition out of Sk, or that a channel 
contains a message for which there is an enabled receive transition. If we have 
proved that the protocol is free from unspecified receptions, there is always an 
enabled receive transition for the next message on the channel. Thus, a deadlock 
occurs only if the system is in a non-final state from which there is no enabled send 
transition and all the channels are empty. Formally, 
Let Nc be the set of message types of the messages in next,. For each message 
type t in N~, let Bi (0< i <~j) be the guards on the receive transitions of type t 
on channel c out of Sk. (If there is no outgoing transition for a type t, the 
corresponding uard is false.) Let Gi (0< l~  < m) be the guards on the send 
transitions. The protocol is free from deadlock if for all non-final states Sk, 
Pk ~ (3l:Gz) v3  channel c: (3 type t~N~:[3i:Bi]). (3.2a) 
If the protocol is free from unspecified receptions, (3.1) holds, and (3.2a) reduces 
to 
Pk ~ (31:Gt)v (3 channel c: c is not empty). (3.2b) 
3.3. Boundedness of channel size 
The number of messages in a channel is bounded by length(Sentc)- 
length(Receivedc). To prove that it is bounded by M, one proves that every predicate 
Pk implies that length(Senti) - length( Received~) <<- M. 
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3.4. Other safety properties 
In general, any safety property P can be proved by showing that every predicate 
Pk implies P. 
3.5. Example 
In Appendix B, we show that the protocol in Figs. 2 and 3 is free from deadlock, 
that the accepted sequence is an initial subsequence of the data sequence, and that 
the number of messages in any channel is always less than M. 
4. The complete model 
In this section, we extend the basic model to cover loss of messages and timeouts. 
As in [7], this is achieved by introducing special state transitions into the model. 
In contrast with [19], we express timeout behavior without modeling real time 
explicitly, but by considering the restrictions on the ordering of events imposed by 
timeout semantics. 
4.1. Lost messages 
Loss of messages can be modeled as a property of a channel cby suitably defining 
the function next~. However, loss-free channels are easier to reason about, and so 
we present an alternative method of modeling lost messages. A lossy channel can 
be modeled by treating the channel itself as loss-free, and adding transitions to the 
state transition diagra~ of the destination that allow it to (non-deterministically) 
receive a message and return to the same state without taking any action on that 
message. In other words, the destination is viewed as actually receiving the message 
on a loss-free channel and simply discarding it. Any property proved using this 
state transition diagram, assuming the channels are loss-free, is true of the original 
protocol, with lossy channels. 
'Dropping' a message can be modeled by adding receive transitions as described 
above. To improve readability, we denote these as lose transitions. Lossy channels 
are then modeled as follows. For every state S from which there is a transition 
S-B-Cl-receive( c, type: t, . . .)-C2--> T, 
we add a lose transition, 
S-B-lose(c, type: t , . . . )  --> S. 
Like the receive statement, the lose statement chooses amessage m non-deterministi- 
cally from next~, and extends the sequence Receivedc by that message. The proof 
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rule for the lose statement is similar to that for the receive: 
{Vm ~ nextc with m.type .. ,,Received.,, ...... ~. 1 = I .  l'Receioeai:[.rn', m.f,K,...,m.fk~ 
lose(c, type: t, f l :v l ,  . . . , fk:Vk) 
{e} 
4.2. T imeouts  
Many protocols use timeouts to detect lost messages. We call a process that sends 
a message and sets a timer the sender, and the process that receives the message 
and sends an acknowledgement the receiver. For every message sent, there is an 
associated t imer- ID that identifies a particular software or hardware timer. This 
timer is set to a t imeout interval when the message issent. When an acknowledgement 
for a message is received, the timer with the associated timer-ID is canceled. A timer 
that is not canceled expires at the end of its timeout interval and triggers an interrupt. 
If timer interrupts are not masked, the sender processes the timeout immediately. 
Otherwise, the timeout remains pending until interrupts are unmasked. 
To model timeouts we introduce t imer types. A timer type is a set of timer-ID's. 
Timers are manipulated using the set statement, which adds a timer-ID to a timer 
type, and the cancel statement, which removes a timer-ID from a timer type, if it 
contains the timer-ID, and leaves the timer type unchanged otherwise. The proof 
rules are 
set(type: t, id: i) 
{P} 
{(P t , i~ t)v (Ptt_{i}) }
cancel (type: t, id : i) 
{P} 
Finally, we include a t imeout transition, which has the following form: 
S~-t imeout(  type: t, id :x) --> S:. 
This transition is executable only if the process is in state $1 and t is not empty. 
The transition above is performed by non-deterministically removing a timer-ID 
from t, assigning its value to the variable x, and entering the state $2. The proof 
rule for the timeout statement is
D t,x 1. {Vi:i ~ t:at_ti}, il 
t imeout(  type: t, id :x) 
{P} 
Timeouts are modeled as follows. A set statement is executed whenever the 
protocol sets a timer: a cancel statement whenever it cancels one. From every sender 
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state S where timeout interrupts are not masked, the designer includes a transition 
S-timeont( type: t, id:x) --> T, 
where T is the state entered by the protocol when a timeout interrupt occurs. The 
sender may perform timeout transitions non-deterministically in any state where 
timeouts are not masked; this models the asynchronous nature of timeouts. 
When timeout ransitions are included, a deadlock state is a non-final one out of 
which there is no enabled send, receive or timeout transition. The condition for 
freedom from deadlock (Section 3.2, Condition (3.2b)) becomes 
Let Nc be the set of message types of the messages in next~. For each message 
type t in No let Bi (0 < i<~j) be the guards on the receive transitions of type t 
on channel c out of Sk. (If there is no outgoing transition for a type t, the 
corresponding uard is false.) Let Gt (0<l~<m) be the guards on the send 
transitions. Let Tar be the set of timer types for which there is an outgoing timeout 
transition. The protocol is free from deadlock if for all non-final states Sk, 
Pk ~ (3l:Gi) v 3 channel c: (3 type t~ Nc:[3i:Bi])v 
(3 timer type T ~ TT: T # 0). (4.1a) 
If the protocol is free from unspecified receptions, (4.1a) reduces to 
Pk ~ (3I:G~) v (3 channel c:c is not empty) v 
(3 timer type T ~ TT: T # 0). (4.1b) 
This method of modeling timeouts is adequate for a system in which premature 
timeouts could occur, that is, an acknowledgement could be received for a message 
after its timer expires. The scheme described above does not model a system in 
which only non-premature timeouts occur, because it is always possible for the 
sender to take a timeout transition, even if the corresponding message or its 
acknowledgement has not been lost. 
4.3. Example 
As an example, we present avariant of the alternating bit protocol. In this protocol, 
the sender transmits messages with a one-bit sequence number, and waits for an 
(unnumbered) acknowledgement from the receiver. When the sender receives an 
acknowledgement, it transmits the next message, giving it a sequence number equal 
to the complement of that of the last message sent. If a timeout occurs, the sender 
retransmits the last message, giving it the same sequence number as before. If the 
receiver eceives a message with the same sequence number as the last one accepted, 
it sends an acknowledgement to the sender, but does not accept the message. 
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Otherwise, it accepts the new message and sends back an acknowledgement. 
Figs. 5 and 6 depict this protocol as modeled with lost messages and timeouts. 
// send(SR, type:t, seq: s_no, 
data: info[n_sent + 1]) / \ 
receive(RS, ACK) type: 
I 
l cancel( type: T, id: s_no ); 
n_sent = n_sent + 1; 
s_no  = S~"O; 
set( type: T, id:s_no); 
1 
\ 
) 
( timeout( type: T, id: i )  
--.... 
Iose(RS, type: ACK) 
Sender variables 
info[1...]: 
n_sent: 
s_no :  
infinite array of data items to be transmitted. 
number of data items ent (initialized to 0). 
sequence number of message to be sent. 
Fig. 5. Sender in alternating bit protocol. 
The protocol described above is correct only if all t imeouts are non-premature. 
The scenario in Fig. 7 demonstrates how it could fail in the presence of premature 
t imeouts- - the receiver accepts message m4 without ever accepting m 3 and m2. Such 
timing problems motivate the need for modeling non-premature timeouts. This is 
described in the next section. 
4.4. Non-premature timeouts 
The basic property of a non-premature t imeout is that a t imeout for a message 
occurs only if the message or its acknowledgement is lost. This is modeled as follows. 
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receive (SR, type: t, seq: s0 
data:d_item) 
\ 
I Iose(SR, type: t, seq: s, 
data:d_item) 
set( type: T, id: s) 
s = exp 
n_recd = n_recd + 1; 
accepted[n_recd] = d_item; 
exp = e-"~; 
" -~ send (RS, type: ACK) ) ~r send (RS, type: ACK) ) 
Receiver variables 
accepted[1 . . .]: 
d_item: 
s: 
exp: 
n_recd: 
array to place data items accepted 
(all elements are initialized to undefined). 
data item in last message received. 
sequence number of last message received. 
sequence number of next message expected (initialized to 0). 
number of data items accepted (initialized to 0). 
Fig. 6. Receiver in alternating bit protocol. 
Instead of executing a set statement at the time a message is sent, it is executed at 
the time when the message or its acknowledgement is lost. Hence canceling of 
timeouts is not necessary. When a message is lost, the corresponding lose transition 
in the receiver is followed by a set statement for the timer of the message lost. When 
an acknowledgement is lost, the sender executes set statements for every message 
that would have been acknowledged by it. (An acknowledgement may acknowledge 
more than one message.) This scheme ensures that a timer-ID is added to a timer 
type if, and only if, a message or its acknowledgement is lost. Hence, a timeout 
transition corresponding to a message can be taken only under these conditions, 
and the basic property of non-premature timeouts is modeled. 
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Sender Receiver 
send m,, seq = 0------__ 
~, receive m,, accept 
send ack, expect seq 1 
premature timeout 
send m,, s e q = O ~  
-~ receive m,, ignore since seq ~ exp 
• ~ ~ ack 
receive ack ~ send m2, seq = 1 s e n d  
receive ack f m= 
send m3, seq = 0 ------._ 
receive m3, ignore since seq ~ exp 
--send ack 
receive ack ~ 
send m 4, seq = 1-----~-_ 
~receive m4, accept 
Fig. 7. Failure of alternating bit protocol if timeouts are premature. 
time 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the alternating bit protocol as modeled with non- 
premature timeouts. 
4.5. Proof of the alternating bit protocol 
In this section we use our model of non-premature timeouts to prove that if all 
timeouts are non-premature, the sequence of accepted messages in our variant of 
the alternating bit protocol is an initial subsequence of the messages ent. Because 
TS2 
receive(R$, type: 
nL, o, = o_ ,en ,  + 
_no = S~no; 
• /  send (SR, type: t, seq: s_no, 
~_  data: info[n_sent + 1]) ) TS3 
~ ( timeout( type: T, id: i ) 
t. type:  T. s_oo  
Fig. 8. Sender protocol with non-premature timeouts. 
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data :d_ i tem)  data :d_ i tem)  
TRI~4 
n_recd = n_recd  + 1; 
accepted[n_recd] = d_ i tem;  
exp = exp; 
I 
t 
Fig. 9. Receiver protocol with non-premature timeouts. 
this protocol could fail if timeouts are not premature, this proof demonstrates the 
power of our model of non-premature timeouts. We also prove that the protocol is 
free from deadlock and unspecified message receptions, and that the channel size 
is bounded by 1. 
Figure 10 depicts the system state transition diagram and Fig. 11 shows Pi, j for 
all states Si, j. For all i and j, Pi, j implies RES, and RES implies that the accepted 
sequence of messages i an initial subsequence of info. 
State &,o is the only state in which a deadlock could occur, since all other states 
have enabled send transitions out. It follows from Pl,o that the assertion 
size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) +ITI--- 1 (4.2) 
is true in $1,o. (4.2) implies that one of the transitions out of state S~,o is always 
enabled and no deadlock can occur. 
State S~.o is the only state in which unspecified message receptions could occur, 
since for all other states, P~j implies that 
size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) = O, 
i.e., both channels are empty. It can be seen from Fig. 10 that there is an enabled 
receive transition for both types of messages t and ACK out of state S~,o. Hence 
the protocol is free from unspecified message receptions. 
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TR2~~ 
TRI TSI $3 TR4 
TR2 
TS3 
Fig. 10. System states of alternating bit protocol. 
RES:  
INV:  
Po,o: 
",,o: 
Po,,: 
0< i< n_recd : info[ i] = accepted[i] 
s_no = exp ~ n_sent = n_recd ^  
s_no # exp ~ n_sent + 1 = n_recd A 
3m:  in_channelRs(m) ~ s_no # exp ^  
in_channelsR(i)  ~ (i.seq = s_no ^  i.data = info[n_sent + 1]) A 
s_no, exp e {0, 1} 
RES A INV ^ (s i ze_o f (SR)  + s ize_of (RS)  +ITI = 0) 
RES ^ INV ^ ( size_of( SR  ) + size_of( RS)  +IT[ = 1) 
false 
RES ^ INV ^ (s i ze_o f (SR)  + s ize_of (RS)  +IT I = 0) A 
d_i tem = info[ n_sent + 1] ^  s = s_no 
Fig. 11. Assertions for the alternating bit protocol. 
In all states the assertion s i ze_o f (SR)+s ize_o f (RS)<~ 1 is true, therefore the 
channel sizes are bounded by 1. 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a detailed technique for proving properties of communicating 
processes. It integrates two approaches: the finite state machine model and the 
programming language model. The technique can be used without variables and 
assertions, in which case it reduces to the former model. One can instead eliminate 
states and obtain the latter. However, the versatility of this approach arises from 
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the fact that it allows these two models to be combined, making use of explicit 
states, as well as including variables and assertions. Making states explicit reduces 
the complexity of proofs in the programming language model; including variables 
and assertions eliminates the state explosion of the finite state machine model. 
We have demonstrated how to model various properties of communication chan- 
nels and timeout behavior, including premature and non-premature timeouts. We 
have also shown how to prove safety properties like freedom from deadlock and 
unspecified message receptions, and boundedness of channel size. The modeling 
technique is independent of the proof logic system used, and the axioms for the 
send and receive statements can be adapted to suit any other system, such as temporal 
logic [12-14, 16], to prove liveness properties like progress and termination. 
This approach is illustrated by first considering a sliding window flow control 
protocol. With the finite state approach, proofs of the sliding window protocol have 
been intractable for large window sizes because of the exponential growth of the 
global reachability tree. We have illustrated the versatility of our model of timeouts 
in the proof of an alternating bit protocol that is correct only if timeouts are 
non-premature. 
In conjunction with a theorem prover, this model is well suited to form the basis 
of an automated protocol verifier. Given the description of the processes participating 
in a protocol, the global state transition graph can be constructed automatically 
[22]. A theorem prover can then be used to validate the system state assertions, and 
to prove that the assertions imply the desired properties. 
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Appendix A. Detailed proof of transition TS1 
We must show that {Po,o} TS1 {Po,o} is a theorem. (Notation and assertions are 
given in Fig. A.1.) Since TS1 is a send transition, the send rule applies. Let S 
represent the program segment 
s_ high = s_high ~ 1; 
high = high + 1; 
To apply the send rule, we must find an assertion Q, such that 
{Po.o A s_highOs_low < W_SIZE} S {Q} (A.1) 
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Notation 
Let in_channelc(i) stand for the assertion "i is the index of a message in channel c 
that has not been received", i.e. length(Receivedc) < i <~ length(Senti). 
Let in_window(s) stand for "the sequence number s is in the sender window", i.e. 
s ~ (s_ low. . .  s_high]. 
Let size_of(c) be equal to length(Sentc)-length(Receivedc). 
Assertions 
RES: /* Result */ 
{accepted(k] ~ t~ ~ accepted(k] = info[k]} 
A {Vk: 0 < k <~filled: accepted(filled] ~ f~}. 
Po: /* Relationships between variables , /  
s_low = low rood M A s_high = high rood M ^ r_Iow =filled rood M A 
high = low + (s_high G s_Iow) A lOW <~ filled < low + M. 
PI: /* the sequence numbers carded in data messages, acknowledgements, and 
negative acknowledgements all belong to the sender window. */ 
Vi: { in_ channelsa ( i ) v in_ channelRs( i )} : in_ window( i.seq ). 
P2: /* The data field of the data messages are taken from info in order */ 
Vi: in_channelsR( i): i.data = info[s_low + ( i.seq ~ Iow)]. 
P3: /* A particular sequence number occurs at most once among all the data 
messages, acknowledgements, and negative acknowledgements that are still 
in a channel */ 
Vi, j: {i ~ j  ^  in_channelsR( i) A in_channelsR(j)}: i.seq ~ j.seq ^  
Vi, j: {i ~ j  A in_channeIRs( i) ^ in_channelRs(j)} : i.seq ~ j.seq A 
V i,j: { in_channelsR (i) A in_channelRs (j)}: i.seq ~ j.seq. 
P4: /* If sequence number s is not on the sender window, acknowledged(s] is 
false, and if acknowledged(s] is true, no message on either channel carries 
the sequence number s */ 
{in_window(s) = F} ~ {acknowledged(s] = F} ^  
acknowledged(s] ~ Vi: { in_channelsR( i) v in_channeIRs( i)} : i.seq ~ s. 
INV:  RES  ^  Po A P1 A P2 A P3 ^  P4. 
Ao: in_window (s_no) A d_item = info[ low+(s_noOs_low)]  
A acknowledged [ s_ no ] = F A V i: { in _ channelsR (i) v in _ channeIRs (i) }: 
i.seq # s_no. 
A1: acknowledged[s_last] = F A Vi: {in_channels~(i) v in_channelRs(i)}: 
i.seq ~ s_last. 
The assertions associated with the system states are then, 
Po.o = INV ^ s_high E) s_low = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) 
Po,~ = INV A Ao A s_high 0 s_low = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) + 1 
Pl,o = INV ^ AI A s_high ~ s_low = size_of(SR) + size_of(RS) + 1 
Pl,l = INV A Ao A A1A s_high E) s_low = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) + 2 
Fig. A1. Assertions for system states.  
20 T.A. Joseph et al. 
is a theorem, and 
{Q} send(SR, type: t, seq: s_high, data: info[high]) {Po,o} (A.2) 
follows from the send axiom. Since W_SIZE<~M-1, (A.1) can be proved by 
showing that 
{Po.o^s_high~s_low<M-1} S {Q} (A.3) 
is a theorem. Using a proof logic system, such as in [15], we prove the following 
theorems: 
{RES} S {RES}. (i) 
(The program segment S does not reference any variable in RES.) 
{PoA s_high~s_low <M-1} S {Po} (ii) 
(Because s_high and high are incremented in S, the assertion s_high = high rood M 
remains true. Because s_highE)s_low < M-1 ,  incrementing s_high increases the 
value of s_high 0 s_Iow by 1. Hence, high = low + (s_high 0 s_low) remains true.) 
{ P1 ^  s_high ~ s_low < M - 1} 
S 
{ P1 ^  V i:[ in_channelsR( i) v in_channelRs( i) ]: i.seq ~ s_high} (iii) 
(Because s_highOs_low<M-1,  incrementing s_high increases the size of the 
sender window. Since the sequence numbers of all messages in the channels were 
in the original sender window, they are in the new sender window. Hence, P1 remains 
true. Furthermore, since s_high was not in the original sender window, none of the 
messages in the channels has sequence number s_high.) 
{P2} S {P2} (iv) 
{P3} S {P3} (v) 
(S does not reference any variable in P2 and Pa.) 
{P4As_highE)s_low<M-1} S {P4Aacknowledged[s_high]=F} (vi) 
(Because s_highOs_low<M-1,  incrementing s_high increases the size of the 
sender window. If in_window(s)= F after S, in_window(s) was equal to F before 
S. So acknowledged[s] was equal to F before S. Since S does not mention acknowl- 
edged, its value is unchanged. Hence P4 is true after S. Also, s_high was not in the 
original window, hence acknowledged[s_high] was equal to F. This remains true 
after S.) 
{s_high G s_low = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS)} 
S 
{s_high 0 s_Iow = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) + 1} (vii) 
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From (i) through (vii) it follows that 
{Po.o A s_high ~ s_low < M - 1} 
S 
{ INV A (s_high ~ s_low = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) + 1) A 
(acknowledged[s_high] = F) ^ 
(V i:[ in_channelsR( i) v in_channel, s(i)]: i.seq ~ s_high)} 
is a theorem. The post-condition above implies 
Sent p sR (A.4) [ 0,0] SentsR-{type:MSG , seq:s_high, data:info[high]} 
Using the assertion (A.4) in the place of Q in (A.3) and (A.2) above completes the 
proof. 
Appendix B. Proof of sliding window protocol 
We now show that the protocol in Figs 2 and 3 is free from deadlock, and that 
the accepted sequence is an initial subsequence of the data sequence, and that the 
number of messages in any one channel is always less than M. 
From the state transition diagram in Fig. 4, we see that states S0,1, $1,o, and S~.~ 
all have outgoing send transitions that are always enabled. State So,o is the only 
state in which a deadlock could possibly occur. The only send transition from So.0 
is TS1, which has the guard Go = s_high E)s_Iow < SW_SIZE. The receive transitions 
have guards true. Because the channels are FIFO, the sizes of the sets NSR and NRs 
are at most 1. At any time, the set NsR has one of two values, 0 or {MSG}. The set 
NRs takes on values gl, {ACK}, and {NAK}. To prove freedom from deadlock, we 
must show (3.2b), which here is 
INV  A s_high ~ s_Iow = size_of( SR ) + size_of( RS) 
[s_high~s_low < SW_SIZE v 3channel c: Nc ~ 0] (B.1) 
(B.1) is true provided that the maximum sender window size SW_SIZE > 0. There 
are two cases. The first case is if s_highOs_low < SW_SIZE. (B.1) follows immedi- 
ately in this case. The other case is if s_high 0 s_Iow >t SW_SIZE. Since SW_SIZE > 
O, s_high 0 s_Iow > 0, and size_of(SR) + size_of(RS) > 0. Hence, =:lchannel c: Nc ~ 0, 
and (B.1) is true. 
The safety property that the accepted sequence is an initial subsequence of info 
follows immediately from the fact that RES is true in all states. 
It follows from assertions P~j that size_of(SR)+size_of(RS)<~s_highE)s_low. 
The modulo M difference is always in the range from 0 to M - 1. Hence the channel 
sizes are bounded by 
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